In war, there are many ways to define victory. So, who won the Battles of Lexington and Concord? On the surface this may seem simple. The colonists were able to keep most of their military supplies safely out of British hands. The British soldiers then suffered heavy casualties during their retreat to Boston where they were trapped and besieged. However, though things certainly did not go the way they wanted, did the British Army actually lose on April 19, 1775? The answer depends upon how you define victory.
On April 18, 1775, General Thomas Gage ordered Lt. Colonel Francis Smith to march with several hundred soldiers 18 miles from Boston to Concord, to “seize and destroy all Artillery, Ammunition, Provisions, Tents, Small Arms, and all Military Stores whatever…” This makes for a round trip of nearly 40 miles through a hostile countryside.
The mission did not start out well. Fighting erupted at dawn in Lexington where the first colonists were killed. At Concord, most of the military supplies the British came looking for had already been moved. Around 9:30 a.m. more fighting broke out at the North Bridge, where the first British soldiers died. All that was left to do now was to return to Boston. The British began their march around noon as thousands of rebel militiamen were fast approaching.
Marching a column of troops through hostile territory is a complicated and dangerous operation. Not surprisingly, there is a manual for that. Among the most influential military books of the 18th century was A Treatise of Military Discipline by Lieutenant General Humphrey Bland. Bland devoted an entire chapter to “…Marching of a Regiment of Foot, or a Detachment of Men, where there is a Possibility of their being Attacked by the Enemy.”
Bland recommended forming strong advance (van) and rear guards. The purpose of the vanguard was “to reconnoiter, or view, every place where any number of men can lie concealed, such as woods, copses, ditches, hollow ways, straggling houses, or villages, through which you are to march or pass near…” The rear-guard was to provide security for the rear of the column. In between the van and rear-guard, were “flanking parties.” These were “small parties, commanded by sergeants, marching on the flanks (sides) of the battalion with orders to examine all the hedges, ditches and copses which lie near the road…”1
The agricultural terrain favored the Colonial militia
There is strong evidence that the British column was organized for the return march using the principles laid out in Bland’s Treatise… For example, Ensign DeBerniere, 10th Reg’t of Foot, wrote “…we began the march to return to Boston, about twelve o’clock in the day, in the same order of march, only our flankers were more numerous and further from the main body…” 2 Later, Lt. Frederick MacKenzie, who marched with the reinforcements, wrote that his brigade “… marched in the following order, Advanced guard of a captain and 50 men; 2 six-pounders… Rear guard of a Captain and 50 men.”3
Smith was also fortunate that half of his force was made up of the light infantry. Light infantry were soldiers who were specially trained to operate in small units, take advantage of cover, and skirmish with the enemy. In 1771 the Army officially added one company of light infantry to each regiment.4
Despite this, the retreat to Boston was tough going. The column had not even made it out of Concord when they were attacked by newly arrived militia companies from Reading, Chelmsford, and Billerica.5 The broken agricultural landscape played much to the colonists’ advantage. According to Lt. John Barker, 4th Regiment of Foot, “…the Country was an amazing strong one, full of hills, woods, stone walls, &c., which the Rebels did not fail to take advantage of…” 6
In describing the activity of the light infantry, Captain William Soutar of the Marines wrote “Sometimes we took possession of one hill, sometimes of another…” 7 This indicates that the flanking parties were not simply sweeping across the landscape, but actively attempting to control key terrain, like hills. Imagine keeping that up for 18 miles!
As the afternoon wore on, the situation grew desperate. According to Ensign Henry DeBerniere “…when we arrived within a mile of Lexington, our ammunition began to fail, and the light companies were so fatigued with flanking they were scarce able to act, and a great number of wounded scarce able to get forward, made a great confusion…”
Sometime around 3:00 p.m. Brigadier General Hugh, Earl Percy arrived with about 1,000 reinforcements from 1st Brigade.8 The brigade, though delayed, arrived east of Lexington Center just as Smith’s column was falling apart.
Though temporarily halted by Percy’s arrival, the rebels again moved in to attack. According to Lt. Frederick MacKenzie, “During this time the Rebels endeavored to gain our flanks, and crept into the covered ground on either side, and as close as they could in front, firing now and then in perfect security. We also advanced a few of our best marksmen who fired at those who shewed themselves.” These professional soldiers were neither easy targets nor sitting ducks.
As the march resumed, the Colonial militia’s numbers increased. The more thickly settled village of Menotomy (today Arlington) provided a new opportunity. Lt. MacKenzie wrote “…we were fired upon from all quarters but particularly from the houses on the roadside, and the adjacent stonewalls. …the Soldiers were so enraged at suffering from an unseen Enemy, that they forced open many of the houses from which the fire proceeded and put to death all those found in them…”
In Cambridge, Percy veered his column onto the road to Charlestown instead of continuing through Cambridge and across Charles River, where the rebels were waiting in ambush. This unexpected move temporarily threw off the pursuit and likely saved many lives.9
Pressing forward more danger lay ahead. A large force from Salem and Marblehead arrived within musket range of Charlestown Neck. For reasons still unexplained, these Essex County men, led by Colonel Pickering, did not attack. This allowed the British column to escape into Charlestown where they took a strong position on Bunker Hill.10 It was near 7:00 p.m. and the fight was over. Who won?
In terms of numbers, the British suffered more casualties than the colonists. However, Smith and Percy were able to bring the majority of their soldiers, outnumbered more than two to one, home after a march of nearly 40 miles – half of it under fire. In such a dire situation, survival is a victory in itself. In truth however, neither side considered the events of that day a victory. For the British Army it was a disaster. For the colonists, it was a tragedy.
All photos courtesy of the author
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1Bland, Humphrey. A Treatise of Military Discipline: In which is Laid Down and Explained the Duty of the Officer and Soldier, Thro’ the Several Branches of the Service. Ireland, D. Midwinter, J. and P. Knapton, 1743. 2Account of Ensign Henry DeBerniere, report to General Gage, Massachusetts Historical Society, Vol. 4, pgs 215-219. Also published in Kehoe, Vincent, “We Were There! April 19, 1775” 1974. 3French, Allen, “A British Fusilier in Revolutionary Boston: Being the Diary of Lieutenant Frederick MacKenzie, Adjutant of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, January 5 – April 30, 1775”, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1926. 4Macniven, Robbie, “British Light Infantry in the American Revolution” Osprey Publishing Ltd, Oxford UK, 2021 pg 11. 5Sabin, Douglass, “April 19, 1775, A Historiographical Study, Part IV: Meriam’s Corner”, Minute Man National Historical Park, National Park Service, Concord MA. 1985. 6Atlantic Monthly, Volume 39, “Diary of a British Soldier: John Barker, Lieutenant, King’s Own Regiment” April 1877. 7Kehoe, Vincent, “We Were There! April 19, 1775: Captain William Soutar, Correspondence” 1974. 8Boston National Historic Sites Commission, “The Lexington-Concord Battle Road Hour-by-Hour Account of the Events Preceding and on the History-Making Day April 19th 1775” Eastern National, 2010, pg 25. 9Fischer, David Hackett “Paul Revere’s Ride” Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1994. Pg 259. 10Ibid pg 260.
